'Most introductory textbooks emphasize the boost to aggregate demand, interest rates and prices arising from expansionary" tiscal policy actions. See, tor example, the macroeconomics sections of Dolan (1983) , McConnell (1984) , or Samuelson and Nordhaus (1985) . These texts also discuss some of the theoretical reservalions about these channels of influence raised below. Note that the hypothesized reduction in investment does not exceed the initial rise in aggregate demand for goods and services that arises from deficit' increasing fiscal actions.
interest rates and have promoted the crowding out of investment, But this view is based on the conventional deficit/aggregate-demand hypothesis that also holds that an expanded deficit should increase both output and the price level. The latter conclusions became center stage in 1980-81 when the Reagan economic pr'ogram was debated. 'their empir'ical validity, which r'emains largely unquestioned, was strongly r'ejected after mid-1981 when, with the deficit expanding, inflation plummeted from double-digit levels and the economy entered the longest and most severe recession since the 1930s.
Interest rate developments were also at odCs with the conventional view. Chart I shows the total government deficit as a percent of GNP and the AAA bond yield since 1950. The surge to historically high interest r'ates occurred well before the 1981-82 surge in the deficit .21 he recent rise in the deficit occurs from the third quarter of 1981 to the fourth quarter of 1982. when the AAA bond yield declined from about 15 percent to 12 percent. Then, in 1983-84 , the deficit declined sharply relative to CNP, hut the AA\ bond yield rose.
The principal difficulty in finding a positive r'elationship between deficits and interest rates arises from the fact that both the budget deficit and interest rates move cyclically and in opposite directions. Flence, it is not surprising, especially for shor't-ter'm interest r'ates, that empirical studies often turn up supposedly sig-2 Similarly, the appreciation of the dollar precedes the deficit surge.
The steady upward appreciation of the trade-weighted exchange rate for the U.S. dollar began at the end of 1979 (when interest rates soared) and was not noticeably affected by the 1981-82 deficit surge.
Aaa Bond Yield and Total Government Deficit as a Percent of GNP
nificant negative statistical r'elationships between inter'est rates and deficits, When one uses deficits constructed on a high-employment basis -that is, with systematic cyclical influences removed -there still is no evidence ofa positive relationship between deficits and either short-or long-tern) interest rates over the period 1955-83.' 'See Tatom (1984) . Efforts to control for future inflation expectations to capture real interest rate changes do not affect the observed absence of a deficit effect on interest rates. Also, some analysts conjecture that the debt'GNP ratio positively influences the interest rate. Regressions of quarterly changes in the kM bond yield or three-month Treasury bill rates on changes in the ratio of net federal debt to GNP, controlling for changes in the capacity utilization rate and the inflation rate one quarter ahead, yield a negative but insig' nificant relationship for the debt ratio over the period 11955 to 111/ 1984.
The independence of interest rates from the deficit has been observed by Evans (1985) . Also see Fetdstein and Eckstein (1970) , Sargent (1973) , and the recent Treasury study (1984) . Plosser (1982) Chart 2 shows private domestic investment as a share of GNP. Investment has declined and risen cvclically since 1980, hut these svvtngs obscure the strength of investment over the past four years. When the capacity utilization rate is relatively low, the demand for new capital can he met more easily by the reemployment of existing capital instead of investment in new facilities, Thus, the share of investment in GNP and the capacity utilization r'ate tend to move in tandem or to be positi~'e1vcorrelated. to 1984, the capacits' utilization rate was well below its 1979 level, when the prior peak investment ratio was acnieved. Nevertheless, the share of private domestic investment in GNP in 1984 virtually matched this peak level.
Even plant and equipment nonresidential fixedj investment has been quite high by historical standards. despite the recessions in 1980-82. When nominal rnr515253545556575859606r6263b46566676a697o7r727314756zr7sl9rozrrIsai4r9rs Sh., d, d, , , &, n, , p', , , , ' p, ''d, pI~u.d: 2, , d nonresidential fixed investment and GNP are adjusted by their respective deflators, in order to measure r'eal investment as a share of real GNP, the recent strength of plant and equipment spending relative to real GNP represents a postwar peak performance. This share is shown in chart 3. Note that, even at the depths of the previous two recessions, real plant and equipment purchases were about as large a share of real GNP as the 11 percent attained at the peaks of previous investment booms in 1966 and 1969. The conventional argument, that investment has been unusually weak due to the higher real rates of inter'est, is not obviously important in explaining recent investment experience.
'The reason for the greater real strength is thai the relative price for new plant and equipment declined sharply since 1980. The nonresidential fixed investment deflator declined 14.2 percent relative to the GNP deflator from 1980 to 1984. .I.'iSfjAL: POLICY A closer' look at the theoretical mechanism underlying conventional analyses of the deficit reveals some of the potential shom'tcomings of these analyses. In the textbook view of the effects of fiscal policy on the economy, increased gover'nment deficits expand aggregate demand, spending, output and employment, regardless of whether larger deficits arise fi'om increases in purchases, transfer payments or reductions in taxes. So-called balanced-budget increases in transfer payments, in which a rise in transfer payments is matched by a rise in taxes, leave aggregate demand unchanged ignoring distribution effectsi, while taxfinanced increases in government purchases raise aggregate demand, Such conventional analyses also take into account crowding out -reductions in private spending that 'l'he important link between fiscal polkw, aggregate demand and interest rates and the concept of crowding out of private expenditures can be illustrated in the market for saving. In figure 1 . the demand for saving is taken to he the demand fox' funds to finance investment. Other things that influence investment remaining the same, the deniand fot' investment or for saving to finance it, is inversely related to the interest rate. The supply of saving consists of private savinghousehold disposable income less desired consumption expenditures -and government saving -the excess of tax receipts over government expenditures, or the budget surplus. In figure 1 , the national saving schedule is drawn as upward-sloping, indicating that, given income, households reduce consumption expenditures and save more at higher' interest rates. In equilibrium at point A, the interest rate equates the supply and demand for national saving at interest rate 1,,.
In the conventional analysis, fiscal policy actions affect national saving, investment and the interest rate by lii directly changing the bitdget surplus or government saving, and/or' 12) altering prvate saving. Such changes shift the national saving schedule. Given GNP and interest rates, a fall in taxes or a rise in transfer payments tfinanced by borrotvingi adds to disposable income, increasing both private consumption expenditures and pnvate saving. Since par't of the tax cut or transfer payment is spent for consumption, the nse in private saving is less than the deficit increase. Thus, national saving declines, Such a decline also indicates that desired aggregate demand for goods and services has risen so that it must exceed the given level of GNP; the aggregate demand increase equals the reduction in national saving. With no change in GNP, the interest rate must rise to equate national saving and investment. In response to the higher inter'est rate, investment is crowded out, or declines, hut some of the initial shortfall in national saving is eliminated since individuals also increase private saving.
A rse in government purchases also affects national saving. In contrast to a tax cut or a rise in transfer payments, a rise in government purchases does not change disposable income, so consumption expenditur-es and private saving remain unchanged. But the rise in purchases raises the budget deficit or' reduces government saving. National saving falls 1w exactly the change in aggr-egate demand fort' goods and services, as was the case above fot' the tax or' transfer payment Notional saving change. In this case, however', the rise in aggregate demand is the government's, wiule before it was the policy-induced change in private consumption expenditures. As before, however, interest r'ates will tend to rse, increasing pr'ivate saving and reducing consumption and investment expenditures.
Thx'financed changes in gover'nment purchases, on the other' hand, r'educe private saving, given the interest tate and GM'. The higher tax reduces disposable income arid therefore both consumption expenditur'es and private saving. The reduction in private saving is less than the tax increase, because private expenditures on goods and services also decline, Since the government deficit does not change with such a fiscal action, the decline in national saving equals the reduction in private saving. The reduction in national or' private saving again indicates a rise in aggregate demand for goods and services. Taxfinanced changes in transfer payments have no effect on aggregate demand for goods and services or the national saving schedule in figure 1, since the governSaving and ment deficit and disposable income remain uninvestment changed. Thus, private and total spending on goods and services and private and national saving are a~u unaffected.
In summary, the initial effects of fiscal policy actions on private and national saving are the critical counterparis of any initial change in aggr'egate demand for' goods and services;both indicate the extent ofupward pressure on interest r'ates. The analysis here illustrates the importance of both of these initial shifts. It also indicates why crowding out tends to occur. In the conventional analysis, however', crowding out is gener'allv pr'esumed not to be complete.'
The growth in aggregate demand associated with r'eductions in national saving can raise or "crowd in" GNP. When GNP rises, disposable income, consumption expenditures and private saving rise; the initial reduction of private and national saving is offset by 'The Council of Economic Advisers (1985), pp. 70-77, suggests that economic theory and evidence support "complete" crowding out, where the total real demand for goods and services is unaffected by fiscal policy actions, Whether this crowding out, primarily of investment, arises through interest-rate or price-level crowding out or direct substitution of public for private expenditures is not indicated, The Congressional Budget Office (1985) also provides a detailed discussion of the effects of deficits, A recent review by Brunner (1984) provides the best recent discussion of the theoretical issues associated with the macroeconomic theory of fiscal policy. Also, see Carlson and Spencer (1975 ' The permanent income hypothesis also entails a government budget constraint, which indicates that the present value of current and future government expenditures must equal the present value of current and future taxes. This constraint implies that the method of financing government expenditures is in'elevant; that is, whether current expenditures are financed through taxation or borrowing (future taxes with an equivalent present value) has no influence on the economy.
7 Thus, changes in taxes are offset by equal changes in private saving, and national saving is unaffected.
The second consideration is that government expenditures are, to some degree, substitutes for private expenditures.' For example, an increase in government expenditures for school lunches may reduce private consumption expenditures on such goods; increased public expenditures for transportation ser-'Textbook analyses typically distinguish between permanent and temporary changes in fiscal actions, based on the permanent income hypothesis. Temporary changes in taxes or transfer payments are generally regarded to have lift le effect on private spending or national saving since such changes do not alter perceptions of permanent income or wealth. A type of temporary, or at least transitory, change in the budget arises from the "cyclical deficit." When unemployment rises due to a cyclical fall in income, tax receipts decline and federal expenditures, especially transfer payments for unemployment insurance, rise. As a result, the budget deficit rises. 7 This consideration has come to be called the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem. It is developed by Barro (1974 Barro ( , 1979 and has received strong support from Plosser (1982) , Aschauer (1985) , Tanner (1979) and Korrnendi (1983) . See also Kochin (1974) . 'Bailey (1971) discusses at length the theoretical possibilities that fiscal actions directly influence private sector behavior.
vices may reduce private demand for such investment goods; increased transfer payments provide assistance that ma substitute for private saving and investment. To the extent that such substitution occurs, growth in government purchases crowds out private purchases with no net effect on economic activity; such growth in government purchases results in offsetting reductions in private expenditures including investment. Similarly, growth in transfer-payments can affect the mix of desired private spending. No excess demand for national saving occurs, nor is aggregate demand for goods and services altered; thus, GNP and interest r'ates are not affected by fiscal policy.
The emphasis in this view of fiscal policy is on cx ante crowding out, in which fiscal policy actions are largely offset by direct private sector responses." An increase in government purchases does not have to affect the interest rate; either national saving could remain unaffected by government purchases, as these substitute for private consumption, or investment demand could be reduced equally, as government purchases substitute for investment purchases. Similarly, national saving and private investment can be reduced due to increased transfer payments. Thus, aggregate demand, interest rates and the price level may not be affected by fiscal actions."
If cx ante crowding out leads to private expenditure changes that fully offset fiscal policy actions, then the effects of fiscal actions on the private and national saving will not be the same as in the conventional analysis. One fundamental difference is that a rise in taxes will reduce private saving by an equal amount. Thus, a tax hike will result in an equal reduction in private saving, leaving national saving unchanged." This implies that the effects of government expenditures on national saving are the same whether they are tax-or bond-financed.
Another major difference is that a rise in govern-
'There are exceptions to the conclusion that fiscal actions do not affect aggregate demand. See Hall (1980) and Barro (1981) for discussions of the real output effects of temporary increases in government purchases, especially defense expenditures, even in a Ricardian world. "The absence of effects of fiscal actions on GNP has been a feature of reduced-form estimates like the St. Louis equation for some time.
See Hater (1982) and the references there for recent analyses. Permanent adverse effects of government expenditures on investm ent are found in Carlson (1982) . Also see the references in footnote I. "In the conventional view, a rise in taxes initially reduces disposable income by an equal amount and results in a fractional reduction in private saving. The fraction, called the marginal propensityto save, is generally regarded to be relatively small, on the order of 20 to 30 percent. Table I shows the principal components of the total government surplus as a share ofGNP in 1980, before the ballooning of the federal deficit, and 1984, the latest year available. From 1980 to 1984, the deficit widened from 1.2 percent to 3.4 percent of GNP. The share ofgovernment purchases was unchanged, while the share of transfer' payments rose. The rise in the deficit was accounted for primarily by a rise in transfer payments and, to a smaller extent, by a decline in taxes.' 3 These changes are explained to only a small "Several recent studies have examined the effects of fiscal actions on personal consumption expenditures in tests of ex ante crowding out. See Aschauer (1985), Feldstein (1982) and Kormendi (1983) . These tests allow for direct substitution of government purchases for private consumption expenditures and transfer payments for private saving; they do not address the extent to which government expenditures directly affect private investment expenditures.
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"The decline in the share of government receipts in GNP matches the decline in the share of corporate profit tax liability in GNP.
extent by relative differences in the cyclical performance of the economy in 1980 and 1984. The average unemployment rate of 7.5 percent of the civilian labor forte in 1984 was only slightly higher' than the 7.1 percent in 1980. When unemployment is higher, government transfer payments (especially unemployment compensationt are higher, and, due to cyclical losses in income, tax payments are lower than they would be otherwise.
In the conventional analysis, the effect of the changes in the fiscal stance of the government sector shown in table 1 on saving is to raise the private saving rate (PSRI by a fraction -on the order of about 25 percent -of the increased deficit (2.2 percent) or roughly 0.5 to 0.8 percentage points. Since the expected rise in the PSR is smaller than the rise in the deficit, the national saving rate I NSR) would be expected to fall by the difference, about 1.6 to 1.7 percentage points. Associated with this shift in the national saving rate is an increase in the share of GNP allocated for consumption expenditures and an excess demand for funds to finance investment. In the conventional view, aggregate demand should have risen, improving the cyclical performance of the economy and raising prices, and interest rates should have risen; the latter, of course, should have lowered investment.
In the classical view, part of the increased deficit arose from the reduction in receipts as a share of GNP; this part is expected to be largely offset by a rise in the PSR, leaving the national saving rate unchanged. The remainder of the rise in the deficit, the rise in the share of transfer payments, would be expected to reduce private saving and investment to the extent that households view transfer payments as substitutes for such avenues of wealth accumulation. Thus, the PSR and NSR could be expected to decline by some fraction of the 1.3 percentage-point rise in transfer payments. As a net result of these two forces, the P58 should rise by up to 0.8 percentage points and the NSR should decline slightly. tnter'est rates and the cyclical components of real GNP and employment should be unchanged. a. than replacement cost in computing depreciation a!-lowances. The sharp change iii this adjustment r'efiects the slowdown in inflation fl'om 1980 to 1984, reducing the extent of underdepreciation due to histoncal cost accounting; mor'e important, the change in the adjustment reflects the acceleration of depr'eciation allowed by the 1981 tax act. The latter' is indicated by the large jump in the size of the cor'porate capital consumption allowance (without capital consumption adjustment relative to GNP. This jump accounts for the reported rise in the share of undistributed corporate profits with adjustment) despite the lack of improvement in the cyclical performance of the economy.
Thus, other things have not heeo equal in the determination of saving and investment. 'I'ax cuts arising from accelerated depreciation have added substantially to the private saving rate and made possible the cash flow to finance the deficit induced by such a loss in government revenue, without interest rate changes. But the new incentives also induced a substantial rise in the share of investment in GNP, especially in the share of plant acid equipment investment and a r'edir'ection of investment by U.S. firms from abroad. Not surprisingly then, yields on most pr'ivate assets rose sharply from 1980 to 1984.
'l'he changes in saving and investment r'ates from 1980 to 1984 conform more closely to the expectations of the classical view than to those of the conventional analysis, especially when the investment incentives of the 1981 tax act are taken into account. In the absence of more detailed statistical analysis, however, the data do not yield decisive evidence supporting either' view to the exclusion of the other. The str'ength of investment -arising from impr'oved incentives, despite nearly unchanged cyclical perfor'mance of the economy and a shar'plv higher real rate of ioter'est -has been associated with a substantially smaller' decline in the national saving rate and a much larger rise in the private saving rate than that suggested by the conventional view, however'.
/tie .inrpiktatorts nl'.Fetirbcrai DeiPtUs .i±or C:-uwdlag Ott!~.1 SaSs
'I'able 3 shows the growth in feder'al expenditures as a share of GNP from 1980 to 1984 and unified budget estimates for 1990. The latter ar'e constructed assuming either' no further policy changes or the implementation of administration proposals. In the absence of policy changes, expenditures are highen' in each year than in 1980, resulting in an iniplicit crowding out of Investment." While expenditures acid deficits peak as a share of GNP in 1983, the declines to 1990 are small."
The ex ante cr'owding-out view suggests that tax changes have no effect on national saving, but that changes in government expenditures redirce investment to the extent that such expenditures iower' national saving.'' Increases in government expenditures "The Congressional Budget Office (1985) discusses the effect ot such deficits on the ratio of federal debt to GNP, including the view that it is the level of the debt relative to GNP rather than the deficit that affects interest rates. Their current services estimate ot this ratio rises to near 50 percent ot GNP in 1990, roughly its level in 1959. The view that the comparable decline in this ratio from 1959 to 1974 reduced interest rates is noticeably absent from contemporary or earlier studies. Also see footnote 3 above. "The growth in the government budget deficit from 1980 to 1982 was cyclical in nature and would not have raised interest rates in any case. Investment demand is typically more strongly cyclical than budget deficits so that, even it the conventional view were correct, interest rates would not have risen due to cyclical deficit increases. Barro (1983) and Tatom (1984) detail the cyclical deficits since 1980. "Since gross domestic investment equals national saving plus net foreign saving, the fiscal effects on saving must be mirrored in similar changes in investment, other things equal, 'CV-have little eflèct on interest rates or GNP, in this view, although they do change the mix of GNP and, depending on how they ar'e financed, alter the mix of national saving."
In the absence of policy changes to reduce tire shan'e of government expenditur'es in the nation's output, cr-owding out will remain a serious concern. The administration has proposed cutting the shar'e of federal expenditures in GNP by 1990. This pi-oposal focuses on reductions in government purchases." Such a policy would boost capital formation and economic growth by raising private and national saving n'ates. According to the classical view, however, this may have little effect on interest rates. This view indicates that deficit reduction efforts that focus on raising taxes will have no short-ter'm impact on econonuc performance, but will instead simply reduce private saving by a corresponding amount!'
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Popular anah'ses of recent and prospective U.S. government deficits suggest that deficits have naised output, prices and interest rates and crowded out private investment. 'rhe implication of this view is that future budget cuts, in the short run, will n'etan'd the growth of aggregate demand but will lower interest rates, leading to a strengthening of private investment and longn'un growth.
There are reasons to question the relevance and the "The link between deficits and the price level depends on whether increased deficits raise aggregate demand and on the extent to which deficits are accommodated by monetary growth. The classical view indicates that increased deficits do not raise aggregate demand and, hence, cannot be inflationary. The second issue, however, whether deficits contribute to money stock growth and, hence, inflation, is not examined here. This link between the deficit and inflation is developed more fully in Hem (1981) . See Hamburger and Zwick (1981) for an alternative view. "A detailed analysis of the unified budget proposals indicates that they focus on reductions in federal aid to state and local governments, agriculture and other purchases. These expenditures are principally either part of total government purchases directly, or they finance such purchases at the state and local government level. See Carlson (1985) .
"The earlier discussion does not distinguish between the type of taxes. Thus, the effects discussed are for average relationships.
One of the most important qualifications that this raises concerns business tax changes that change investment incentives, The 1981 improvements in tax incentives for investment certainly lowered taxes and raised the deficit and may, at unchanged interest rates, have left national saving unchanged, as the classical view suggests. But the increased investment demand played a major role in boosting interest rates and thereby affected economic performance. Recent proposals to remove those incentives would reverse many of these effects on economic performance, even it the overall taxes and deficits are unchanged.
accuracy of the conventional view. It pr'ovides an inconsistent new of recent economic developments with inaccuracies ranging from the forecast of booming output, employment and inflation for' 1981 and beyond, to the forecast of rising interest rates. tn addition, the evidence hen'e shows that the expected crowding out of investment has been offset by other' factors, resulting in an investment boom since 1980.
'the alternative hypotheses examined here indicate that fiscal policy actions are largely and directly offset by the private sector. Thus, tax changes are offset by adjustments to private saving, with no direct effect on national saving or investment. This classical view of fiscal policy also emphasizes that increased governmnent purchases ar-c directly offset by reduced private expenditures (especially investment).
According to the classical view, policy actions to reduce the deficit are not likely to affect interest rates and may not affect the investment boomn. For example if deficit reduction entails simply raising taxes, private saving will fall by a like amount and no additional investment will occur. To the extent that deficit reduction focuses on expenditures, however, investment will be strengthened, but without the inducement of lower interest rates.
'l'he evidence from the recent experience suggests that the classical view is correct and indicates the importance of business tax cuts in raising domestic saving, investment and interest rates and reducing U.S. investment abroad. 'the evidence is not decisive as to which view more generally and accurately depicts the effects of fiscal policy on the economy, however'. But both views indicate that domestic investment and economnic growth are impeded by deficits arising fi'om governmnent expenditure growth, amid that they are ultimately improved by n'estn'aint in such gn-owth. Proposals to deal with the deficit without n-aising taxes focus largely on reducing government nondefense purchases. 'the successful implementation of these plans would ultimately r'aise private saving and investment, alter' the composition of national output and pn-omote economic growth. 
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